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Abstract
We conduct an experiment to study how imperfect knowledge of the state
space affects subsequent choices under uncertainty with perfect knowledge of the
state space. Participants in our experiment choose between a sure outcome and
a lottery in 32 periods. All treatments are exactly identical in periods 17 to 32
but differ in periods 1 to 16. In the early periods of the “Risk Treatment” there
is perfect information about the lottery; in the “Ambiguity Treatment” partici-
pants perfectly know the outcome space but not the associated probabilities; in
the “Unawareness Treatment” participants have imperfect knowledge about both
outcomes and probabilities. All three treatments induce strong behavioural dif-
ferences in periods 17 to 32. In particular participants who have been exposed to
an environment with very imperfect knowledge of the state space subsequently
choose lotteries with high (low) variance less (more) often compared to other par-
ticipants. Estimating individual risk attitudes from choices in periods 17 to 32 we
find that the distribution of risk attitude parameters across our treatments can
be ranked in terms of first order stochastic dominance. Our results show how
exposure to different degrees of uncertainty can have long-lasting effects on indi-
viduals’ risk-taking behaviour.
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1 Introduction
Exposure to low probability or unexpected events can influence economic decision
making and perception of risk in future seemingly unrelated domains. For example,
Malmendier and Nagel (2010) show that experiencing macroeconomic shocks—like
the Great Depression—in early life decreases the people’s willingness to take financial
risks in the long run, whereas experiencing an economic boom in the past increases
future participation in the stock market. Nishiyama (2006) demonstrates that the
Asian crisis of 1997 has resulted in a persistent increase in US banks’ risk aversion.
We experimentally investigate how unexpected or rare events influence future risk
attitudes and how strong and long lasting these effects are.
In the literature on decision making under uncertainty, there are three standard
distinct “types” of uncertainty, corresponding to different amounts of information
about objective parameters of the lotteries. In a risky environment a decision maker
knows all possible outcomes, as well as the associated probabilities. In an ambigu-
ous environment the decision maker is typically assumed to know all possible out-
comes but not the corresponding probabilities with which they occur (Ellsberg, 1961;
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006). Such “immeasurable” risk is also of-
ten referred to as Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921). In addition to not knowing
the objective probabilities associated with each outcome the decision maker may be
unaware of some possible outcomes, while at the same time knowing that he/she is
not aware of the entire state space. Throughout the paper, we say that this decision
problem is one with unawareness.
In this paper we study how such imperfect knowledge of the state space affects
subsequent (unrelated) choices under uncertainty with perfect knowledge of the state
space. In particular, participants in the computer lab are first given a sequence of
choices between a fixed lottery and varying sure monetary outcomes (first task).
There are three treatments that differ in the amount of information available about
the lottery. In the Risk treatment participants see all outcomes of the lottery as well
as their probabilities. In the Ambiguity treatment only outcomes are observed. In the
Unawareness treatment participants see only some possible outcomes initially and
no probabilities. Upon choosing the lottery they may become aware of additional
outcomes. In each treatment participants are precisely explained which amount of
1
information they do or do not have. This also means that in the Unawareness treat-
ment they are “aware of their unawareness”. After the first task, participants in all
three treatments are given another sequence of choices between different lotteries and
sure outcomes with all information available (second task).
Since in our experiment participants in the Unawareness treatment are aware of
the fact that they do not know all outcomes this is in principle no different from am-
biguity if one assumes that the decision maker deems “all” outcomes possible with-
out knowing their probabilities.1 Since there are infinitely many possible outcomes
in principle, we will refer to such environments as environments characterized by
unawareness for the remainder of the paper.2
Our main finding is that participants who have been exposed to an environment
with very imperfect knowledge of the state space subsequently display different risk-
taking behaviour in standard decision making under risk. In particular, participants
in the Unawareness treatment choose high variance lotteries significantly less often
than participants in the ambiguity treatment who in turn choose these lotteries sig-
nificantly less often than participants in the risk treatment. We conjecture that these
spillovers are due to the fact that participants in the treatments with less information
about the state space become more sensitive to the variance or risk associated with a
lottery. Hence exposure to larger uncertainty in the first task makes participants react
more to the uncertainty of each of the lotteries faced in the second task. We also find
that, as expected, lotteries with higher expected value are chosen more often than
those with lower expected value and lotteries with higher variance are generally cho-
sen less often than those with lower variance irrespective of the treatment. We then
estimate individual risk attitudes from choices in the second task and find that the
distribution of risk attitude parameters across our treatments can be ranked in terms
of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD). In particular the distribution of risk pa-
rameters in the Unawareness treatment dominates that of the Ambiguity treatment
which in turn dominates that of the Risk treatment in terms of FOSD. These results
demonstrate how exposure to different types of uncertainty—even in such a clinical
environment as a laboratory experiment—can have long-lasting effects on individu-
als’ risk-taking behaviour.
Our second finding is that the decision process in the first task of Unawareness
1Distinguishing probability zero events from unawareness is a topic which has attracted attention
in theoretical research. See Feinberg (2009) for discussion.
2We will discuss this notion and related literature in more detail below. We will come back to this
distinction when we present our results.
2
treatment is qualitatively different from Risk and Ambiguity treatments. In particular,
we find that participants in the Unawareness treatment react to surprise (revelation of
new previously unknown lottery outcome) by choosing the sure outcome in the next
period significantly more often. This reaction is the same irrespective of whether the
surprise is positive or negative. We also find that participants in the Unawareness
treatment react less to the size of the sure outcome and display quicker reaction times
compared to the Risk and Ambiguity treatments which are not significantly different.
This suggests that participants reaction to surprise is not a matter of simply updating
a prior over the set of “all” possible outcomes, but rather a reaction to “unawareness.”
Participants seem to employ different decision heuristics in the first task of Unaware-
ness treatment compared to the (first task of) Risk and Ambiguity treatments.
Previous research has demonstrated that individuals’ decisions are affected by
whether a choice situation displays only risk or whether it is ambiguous (Ellsberg,
1961; Halevy, 2007, among many others). In particular, it was found that people are
ambiguity averse in a way which is inconsistent with subjective probability theo-
ries (Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). The focus of initial experimental
studies was on refuting some of the axioms of subjective probability theories. Ahn
et al. (2010) estimate parametric models of ambiguity aversion and risk aversion
in portfolio-choice problems and find that—despite considerable heterogeneity—the
majority of subjects are well described by subjective expected utility. Gollier (2009)
also studies the relation between risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. These stud-
ies are quite different from our experiment in that we do not compare behaviour
in risky/ambigous environments but rather investigate how having been exposed to
such an environment affects risk attitudes in subsequent unrelated choices. Effects
similar to ours have been documented in several empirical and field studies (Mal-
mendier and Nagel, 2010; Nishiyama, 2006; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009; Osili
and Paulson, 2009). However, to our knowledge this is the first paper to generate
a simple lottery choice environment in the laboratory which enables us to compare
behaviour in risky/ambiguous situations and situations characterized by (awareness
of) unawareness and isolate the persistent behavioural differences generated by each
of these environments.
An additional novelty of our approach is to propose an experimental design to
study (awareness of) unawareness. Unawareness has recently attracted quite a lot
of attention among game theorists. It belongs to the broader literature on bounded
rationality, and more specifically it is a special case of reasoning in the existence of
unforeseen contingencies. One of the main reasons for the great focus that it has re-
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ceived, besides the obvious need to clarify its behavioral implications, is the fact that
the first major contributions in this literature were two negative results which show
that accommodating a notion of unawareness that satisfies some reasonable axioms
is impossible both in a standard state space model (Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini,
1998) and in a syntactic model (Modica and Rustichini, 1994). The proposed solu-
tion, in order to overcome the technical difficulties emerging from these results, was
to make reasoning an awareness-dependent process (Fagin and Halpern, 1988; Mod-
ica and Rustichini, 1999; Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006; Li, 2009), i.e., the agents’
language is restricted by the facts that they are aware of, and they can reason only
within the bounds of their language. All the previous models share the common
feature that agents are unaware of their own unawareness (AU-introspection). More
recently, there have been attempts to extend this framework in a way that captures
states of mind such that agents are aware of the possibility that they may be unaware
of some fact (Halpern and Reˆgo, 2008). This is the case that corresponds to our exper-
iment, since—as mentioned before—participants in our experiment are aware of the
fact that they may be unaware of some outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the details of the experimental
design. Section 3 describes the statistical tools and the mean variance utility model
we estimate. In sections 4 and 5 we present the main results. Section 6 discusses the
results. Appendix 7 contains instructions and further details of the experiment.
2 Experimental Design
In our experiment, participants are presented with 32 consecutive choices between
lotteries and sure outcomes. There are 3 treatments called “Unawareness”, “Ambigu-
ity”, and “Risk”. The treatments differ only in the amount of information about the
lotteries provided to the participants during the first 16 choices. The choices 17 to 32
are exactly identical across treatments.
In each period 1 to 16 participants choose between a fixed lottery and varying sure
outcomes. The lottery is presented in Table 1.
Outcomes (Euro)
-20 -1 Twix 6 8 10 14
0.001 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25 0.379 0.07
Probabilities
Table 1: The lottery from the first 16 choices.
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Notice that apart from the monetary outcomes the lottery also has an outcome
called “Twix”. A participant who chose the lottery and received the Twix outcome
was given a real Twix chocolate bar at the end of the experiment. The idea behind
the introduction of non-monetary outcome is to enlarge the space of outcomes that
participants might consider. The sure outcomes in the first 16 choices varied from 5.4
Euro to 8.4 Euro with a 0.2 Euro interval and occurred in the same random order in
all treatments.3
The treatments differ in the amount of information participants have about the
lottery in Table 1. In the Risk treatment participants observe all outcomes and all
probabilities as shown in Table 1. In the Ambiguity treatment participants know all
outcomes but not the associated probabilities. In the Unawareness treatment par-
ticipants see no probabilities and only some outcomes. In particular, from the first
choice on the participants observe possible outcomes 6, 8, 10 and 14; in period 6 they
are shown the possible outcome –1; in period 11 they are shown Twix; and in period
16 they are shown –20. If a participant chooses the lottery and an outcome is real-
ized that she was previously unaware of (that she did not know previously) she is
informed about it and the outcome will be displayed in all subsequent periods. In
all treatments participants are informed about all those details in the Instructions, i.e.
they know in the Ambiguity and Risk treatment that they know all outcomes and
in the Unawareness treatment they are aware of the fact that they do not know all
outcomes.4 Figures 1.abc show how the choices were presented to the participants.
In all treatments the choices in periods 17 to 32 are between a lottery with 2 out-
comes and different sure amounts. These choices are the same across treatments. Par-
ticipants observe both outcomes and probabilities of their occurrence (see Figure 1.d).
The outcomes of the lotteries vary between 2 Euro and 20 Euro. The probabilities are
chosen such that the expected values of all lotteries are in the interval between 7.94
Euro and 8.05 Euro. The sure outcomes vary between 6 and 8 Euro with a 0.5 Euro
interval.5 All participants are informed that there are no other outcomes than those
shown on the screen. They can also infer that since probabilities add up to one.
At the end of the experiment the participants were paid for one randomly chosen
period in addition to a 4 Euro show-up fee. Overall, 104 participants have partic-
ipated in the Risk treatment; 100 participants in the Ambiguity treatment; and 106
3See Section 7 for more details of the design.
4We ran the treatments in the order Unawareness, Ambiguity, Risk in order to avoid communica-
tion among participants regarding the information provided in different treatments.
5See Section 7.1 for the details.
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Figure 1: Screen shots of a typical choice in periods 1 to 16 in a) Risk treatment; b) Am-
biguity treatment; c) Unawareness treatment: Screen of a participant who received a
Twix some time before Period 6. d) a choice in periods 17 to 32 in all treatments.
participants in the Unawareness treatment.6 All experiments were run with z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007) at Maastricht University in June - October 2010.
3 Methods
In order to estimate risk attitudes we use a mean-variance utility model (Markowitz,
1952). Utility of a lottery is assumed to be a weighted sum of its expected value and
standard deviation. The positive coefficient on the expected value reflects the desire
for higher monetary outcome and the negative coefficient on standard deviation re-
flects risk attitude. It is a well-known fact that mean-variance is consistent with the
expected utility theory if and only if the utility function is quadratic.7 Some neu-
roeconomic evidence (e.g. Preuschoff, Bossaerts, and Quartz, 2006) even claims that
6We also conducted a control treatment where participants faced only the lotteries from periods 17
to 32. Wewill come back to this control treatment briefly in Section 8. The rest of our analysis will focus
exclusively on the treatments discussed above. Other than the control treatment and the treatments
discussed above we did not conduct any other treatments or pilots. We disregard the data from one
session of the Unawareness treatment where there was a substantial program error.
7Tobin (1958) shows that the mean-variance model is consistent with the axioms of expected utility
if the utility function is quadratic. Markowitz (1959) shows the converese, i.e., decisions based on MV
can be reconciled with the axioms of EU only when the utility function is quadratic. For an overview,
see Johnstone and Lindley (2011).
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mean-variance utility is encoded in the striatal regions of the brain.
Consider a lottery ` = (x1  p1, x2  p2, ..., xn  pn). We model utility as
u(`) = Kq + aqE[`]  bqSD[`]
where aq, bq > 0, Kq is a constant,E[`] is expected value, SD[`] is standard devia-
tion and q denotes the treatment (Risk, Ambiguity, Unawareness).8 For the degener-
ate lottery (x) we have u(x) = Kq + aqx. Following (McFadden, 1976), we consider
the random utility logit model which assumes that the probability of choosing the lot-
tery ` over sure outcome x is monotonic with respect to the difference of the utilities
aqE[`]  bqSD[`]  aqx = aq(E[`]  x)  bqSD[`].
Thus, for the choices between lotteries `ti and sure outcomes xti in period t for partic-
ipant i we can use the random effects logit regression
Prob[`ti chosen] = F(E[`ti]  xti, SD[`ti], ...)
to estimate Kq, aq and bq. In what follows the independent variable E[`ti]  xti will
be called dexp and SD[`ti] will be called stdv.
Apart from the choices themselves we use response time, or the time it takes a
participant to choose between lottery and sure outcome, in order to uncover more
behavioral patterns. In general, longer response times reflect more information pro-
cessing before the choice is made (e.g. Gneezy, Rustichini, and Vostroknutov, 2010)
which is typically connected to the complexity of a decision problem. In case of the
choice between two alternatives, the decision is easier the bigger is the gap between
perceived utilities of the alternatives (Bogacz, 2007). Thus, response times can shed
some light on the process by which participants make choices under the different
informational regimes (Risk, Ambiguity and Unawareness).
8We use standard deviation instead of usual variance, because standard deviation is measured in
the same units as expected value, which makes it easier to compare coefficients. There is also am-
ple evidence in neuroeconomics literature in favor of the Temporal Difference (TD) learning model.
In particular, many studies have found the encoding of the TD prediction error in the brain (e.g.
O’Doherty et al., 2003). In case of a choice between two lotteries prediction error naturally trans-
lates into standard deviation (whereas variance corresponds to the squared prediction error). Finally
(and non-surprisingly) our results are robust to using either standard deviation or variance.
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4 Main Result
In this section we analyze treatment differences in the behavior in periods 17 to 32.
As was mentioned above the choices that participants face in these periods are ex-
actly the same in all three treatments. Therefore, any behavioral differences between
treatments should be attributed to the experiences participants had in periods 1 to 16.
We hypothesize that experiencing different levels of knowledge about the state space
in the first 16 periods differentially affects which aspects of the decision problem par-
ticipants become more sensitive to. In particular, participants that have been exposed
to a higher degree of uncertainty in periods 1 to 16 might be more sensitive to the
uncertainty associated with the lottery in periods 17 to 32.
Pr(Lottery)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dexp 1.265*** 1.252*** 1.212*** 1.218*** 1.180***
(0.107) (0.106) (0.063) (0.105) (0.062)
stdv –0.325*** –0.322*** –0.320*** –0.312*** –0.311***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
per –0.056*** –0.043*** –0.043***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
awar 0.859** 1.093*** 1.079*** 1.073*** 1.061***
(0.384) (0.342) (0.328) (0.339) (0.324)
amb 0.513 0.629* 0.555* 0.621* 0.549*
(0.387) (0.344) (0.328) (0.341) (0.325)
awarstdv –0.260*** –0.267*** –0.267*** –0.264*** –0.263***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
ambstdv –0.149*** –0.152*** –0.158*** –0.151*** –0.156***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
awardexp –0.038 –0.015 –0.012
(0.151) (0.149) (0.149)
ambdexp –0.120 –0.107 –0.105
(0.151) (0.150) (0.149)
awarper 0.025
(0.019)
ambper 0.013
(0.019)
const 1.294*** 1.178*** 1.207*** 0.795*** 0.822***
(0.269) (0.248) (0.241) (0.236) (0.228)
N 310 310 310 310 310
Table 2: Random effects panel data logit regression of choices between lotteries and
sure outcomes in periods 17 to 32 (* – 10% significance; ** – 5%; *** – 1%). The num-
bers in parentheses are standard errors. The first 3 columns contain a period term
and/or its interactions. 4960 observations, 310 independent.
Table 2 shows the random effects logit regression of choices in periods 17 to 32.9
9See Section 7.2 for the definitions of the independent variables and Section 7.1 for the exact payoffs
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Independent variables of interest are dexp – the difference between the expected value
of the lottery and the sure outcome (ranging from –0.06 to 2.04 with an average of
0.99); stdv – the standard deviation of the lottery (ranging from 1.73 to 8.46 with an
average of 4.54); per – the number of the period (normalized to range from 1 to 16);
awar and amb – the dummies corresponding to the treatments; and interactions.10 As
can be seen from columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 in all three treatments participants
respond in the same way to the expected values of lotteries and sure outcomes: there
are no treatment effects. Participants also show a slight tendency towards choosing
the sure outcome as periods increase, but again there are no treatment differences
(all coefficients awardexp, ambdexp, awarper and ambper are insignificant). We in-
cluded the variable per as well as interaction effects in regressions (1)-(3) to ensure
that our variables dexp and stdv do not pick up time effects. In fact the correlation
between per and dexp (stdv) is r = 0.1733 (r = 0.0044) respectively (Spearman
correlation test). Regressions (4) and (5) show that our results are robust and quanti-
tatively unchanged if we omit all period terms.
The most interesting effect though is the sensitivity to the standard deviation
of the lotteries across treatments. We observe that the sensitivity to standard de-
viation is lowest in the Risk treatment (stdv), higher in the Ambiguity treatment
(stdv + ambstdv), and highest in the Unawareness treatment (stdv + awarstdv).
In the Ambiguity treatment the regression coefficient for the standard deviation of
the lottery is  0.478 with standard error 0.041 and p < 0.0001. In the Unawareness
treatment it is  0.587 with standard error 0.041 and p < 0.0001 (column 3). The
difference of coefficients between Unawareness and Ambiguity treatments is  0.109
with standard error 0.057 and p < 0.055 (awarstdv - ambstdv). Participants show
different sensitivity to standard deviations of the lotteries in periods 17 to 32 which
are the same across all three treatments.
The dummy variables awar and amb have positive coefficients 1.079 and 0.555 re-
spectively. This means that for the lotteries with standard deviations close to zero
participants choose the lottery with the highest probability in the Unawareness treat-
ment, lower probability in the Ambiguity treatment and the lowest probability in the
Risk treatment. However, for the lotteries with high standard deviation (stdv> 5) the
situation is reversed. The model predicts that participants choose high standard de-
viation lotteries with the lowest probability in Unawareness treatment, higher prob-
used in each of the choices.
10See Section 3 for the explanations why these variables are used.
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ability in Ambiguity treatment and the highest probability in Risk treatment.11 This
lends support to our conjecture that participants on average are more sensitive to the
standard deviations of the lotteries in the Unawareness treatment, and less sensitive
in Ambiguity and Risk treatments.
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of choosing lottery as a function of its standard de-
viation in three treatments.
Figure 2 plots the probability with which a lottery was chosen in periods 17 to
32 as a function of the standard deviation of that lottery. As expected, lotteries with
higher standard deviation are chosen less often reflecting risk aversion. Most interest-
ingly, though, the order of treatments reverses as standard deviation increases. Lot-
teries with low standard deviation are chosen most often in the Unawareness treat-
ment and least often in the risk treatment. For lotteries with high standard deviation
this effect is exactly opposite – they are chosen most often in the risk treatment and
least often in the Unawareness treatment. Interestingly all three treatments intersect
at about the same point.
In terms of the mean-variance criterion aq(E[`]  x)  bqSD[`] our results (from
Table 2) imply the following ranking of our treatments:
aUnawareness = aAmbiguity = aRisk
bUnawareness > bAmbiguity > bRisk.
Hence, while the participants’ reaction to expected value in all treatments is the
same, they react more strongly to variance in the Unawareness treatment than in the
Ambiguity treatment and more strongly in the latter than in the Risk treatment. Keep
11In our data standard deviations range from 1.73 to 8.46.
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in mind that here we are talking about choices in periods 17 to 32, i.e. about the
spillover effect from having experienced choices in a risky/ambiguous environment or
an environment characterized by “unawareness” on standard decision making under
risk. In addition the last column of Table 2 shows that
KUnawareness > KAmbiguity > KRisk.
Taken together this evidence suggests that participants exposed to an environment
characterized by “unawareness” start to focus much more on variance than other
participants. They are less likely to choose lotteries characterized by high variance
and more likely to choose lotteries characterized by very small variance.
Finally, we compare the distributions of individual risk attitudes in periods 17 to
32 in all three treatments. As was mentioned in Section 3 the weight b on standard
deviation in the mean-variance utility model can be thought of as an estimator of risk
attitude. For each participant i in our experiment we ran a logit regression
Prob[`ti chosen] = F(E[`ti]  xti, SD[`ti])
on 16 choices in periods 17 to 32 to estimate individual coefficient bi.12 Figure 3 shows
the cumulative distributions of bi for the three treatments.
0
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.4
.6
.8
1
<-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.1 > 0.1
Individual weights in mean-variance utilityβ
Unawareness
AmbiguityRisk
Figure 3: Cumulative distributions of individual b weights (risk attitudes) in three
treatments. b =  0.3 in the graph indicates a value of b 2 ( 0.4, 0.3]
Notice that cdf of risk attitudes in Unawareness treatment first-order stochasti-
12We dropped participants who always chose either lottery or sure outcome. In total there were 96
participants in the Unawareness treatment, 87 in ambiguity and 97 in the risk treatment.
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cally dominates cdf in Risk treatment. This implies that exposure to an environment
with awareness of unawareness uniformly increases risk aversion (as measured by
bi) of all participants with any risk attitude. The cdf for Ambiguity treatment is in
between the cdfs for the Unawareness and Risk treatments in terms of first order
stochastic dominance in the steep part of the graph where most observations are.
This provides further evidence for the lasting effects of exposure to environments
with varying types of uncertainty on participants risk attitudes.
Result 1 1. Participants in the Unawareness treatment are more (less) likely to choose low
(high) variance lotteries than participants in the Ambiguity treatment than
participants in the Risk treatment, implying the following ranking of risk pa-
rameters b on the population level: bUnawareness > bAmbiguity > bRisk.
2. The distributions of individual risk attitude parameters across the three treat-
ments are ranked as follows in terms of first-order stochastic dominance:
bUnawareness FOSD bAmbiguity FOSD bRisk.
5 Periods 1 to 16
5.1 Choices
For the choices in periods 1 to 16 we analyze behavior in the Unawareness treatment
and in the Ambiguity/Risk treatments separately.
Unawareness Treatment. We will study how “surprise” (becoming aware of new
possible outcomes) affects choices. Understanding whether and how participants
react to what we have termed surprise will help us to gain some insight into whether
we can reasonably assume that participants were unaware of outcomes –1, Twix and
–20 orwhether they considered all outcomes possible treating the situation essentially
as a decision problem under ambiguity.
Figure 4 shows the average choices of participants in the period immediately after
they became aware of outcomes –1 or Twix. There are two ways in which partici-
pants in the Unawareness treatment can receive –1 or Twix: 1) a participant chooses
the lottery and the previously unknown –1 or Twix is realized (it appears on partici-
pant’s screen); 2) a participant chooses the lottery after period 6 (11) and receives –1
(Twix). In the latter case participants are already aware that –1 (Twix) can happen
as possible outcome of the lottery since it is displayed on their screens after period 6
(11) regardless of their choices. Therefore, on average the only difference between the
12
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Figure 4: Probabilities of choosing the lottery in the first 16 periods in the Unaware-
ness treatment after receiving payoff –1 or Twix by surprise.
choices in two cases is the presence/absence of surprise. As Figure 4 clearly indicates
participants tend to choose the lottery significantly less often in the period following
the surprise than in the period following the outcome that participants were aware
of. This effect is strongly significant (Spearman test p < 0.0001). In addition we can
see from Table 3 that participants choose the lottery on average less often over time in
the first 16 periods of the Unawareness treatment. Since the surprise always happens
in earlier periods than the “no surprise” this effect is even probably underestimated
in Figure 3. Note also that it is the mere unexpectedness of the outcome and not its
value that generates this effect since Twix can be thought of as having some positive
value to the participants.
Table 3 reports the logit regression of choices depending on the sure outcome;
period; dummy firstsp that is equal to 1 in all periods including and after the one
in which participant saw first previously unknown outcome (–1, Twix, or –20); and
their interaction. Obviously firstsp is strongly correlated with per by construction.
The table illustrates that participants react to the value of the sure outcome in
the right direction: on average they choose sure outcome more often the bigger it
is (sure). Also over time participants tend to choose the lottery less often in the un-
awareness treatment. Obviously the variable firstsp (which is distinct from surprise
in Figure 4) is highly correlated with period and has a negative coefficient as well in
the regression. Since in Figure 4 we have seen that participants tend to choose the
lottery less often after they have been surprised we conjecture that the negative coef-
ficient on period may at least partly be due to the fact that participants become more
cautious over time because they have experienced “surprise” in the past.
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Pr(lottery)
Unawareness
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
sure –1.623*** –1.274*** –2.149***
(0.226) (0.085) (0.198)
per –0.178*** –0.808***
(0.015) (0.123)
firstsp –6.576***
(1.760)
persure 0.091***
(0.017)
firstspsure 0.623***
(0.236)
const 13.796*** 11.271*** 17.318***
(1.703) (0.698) (1.462)
N 106 106 106
Table 3: Random effects logit regression of choices in the first 16 periods of the Un-
awareness treatment.
All Treatments. Next, we analyze the choices of participants in first 16 periods
across all three treatments. Table 4 reports the logit regression of choices depending
on sure outcome; dummies that indicate the treatment as well as interaction terms.
Pr(lottery)
Risk, Ambiguity, Unawareness
b/(se) b/(se)
sure –2.025*** –2.104***
(0.113) (0.088)
awar –6.294*** –5.748***
(0.996) (0.840)
amb –0.761
(1.161)
awarsure 0.979*** 1.051***
(0.134) (0.114)
ambsure –0.203
(0.164)
const 14.312*** 13.821***
(0.826) (0.621)
N 310 310
Table 4: Random effects logit regression of choices in the first 16 periods of Risk,
Ambiguity and Unawareness treatments.
Important observation is that there are no apparent differences between Risk and
Ambiguity treatment (amb and ambsure are insignificant). This suggests that par-
ticipants in these treatments make choices in similar fashion. However, choices in
Unawareness treatment are very different. Here participants seem to be less sensitive
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to sure outcomes than in the Risk treatment (sure + awarsure). Moreover, partic-
ipants tend to choose sure outcome more often overall (awar). This suggests that
participants may employ different decision heuristics in the Unawareness and Am-
biguity/Risk treatments. One conjecture could be that in the Unawareness treatment
the first occurrence of “surprise” triggers some simple decision heuristic that biases
choices towards sure outcomes (compared to EU maximization).
5.2 Response Times
To shed some more light on the behavior in the Unawareness treatment we analyze
response times of the participants in the first 16 periods. Figure 5 shows the response
times in reaction to surprise. The data points presented on this graph are the same as
on the analogous graph for choices (Figure 4).
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Figure 5: Response times in the first 16 periods in Unawareness treatment after re-
ceiving payoff –1 or Twix by surprise.
We see that in the period immediately following surprise the reaction time is sig-
nificantly higher compared to periods following no surprise. This supports the view
that participants were indeed “unaware” of the outcome previously.
To gain more insight into the nature of the decision process in the first 16 peri-
ods we now look at the response times across treatments. Table 5 shows that re-
sponse time depends on the sure outcome in Risk and Ambiguity treatments in the
right direction: the higher the sure outcome the faster is the decision.13 However,
in Unawareness treatment response time does not react to the value of the sure out-
come (sure + awarsure is insignificant). Moreover, in Unawareness treatment there
13See Section 3 for possible theoretical explanation of this effect.
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is an overall drop in the response time comparing to Risk and Ambiguity treatments
(awar). All this is consistent with the conjecture made in Subsection 5.1 that choice
heuristic is different between Unawareness and Risk/Ambiguity treatments: in Un-
awareness treatment the decisions are faster and less dependent on the sure out-
comes.
Response time
Risk, Ambiguity, Unawareness
b/(se) b/(se)
sure –0.421*** –0.450***
(0.135) (0.101)
per –0.807*** –0.810***
(0.027) (0.026)
awar –8.875*** –9.110***
(1.434) (1.244)
amb 0.478
(1.455)
awarsure 0.446** 0.476***
(0.189) (0.167)
ambsure –0.655*** –0.596***
(0.192) (0.061)
awarper 0.487*** 0.489***
(0.038) (0.037)
ambper 0.243*** 0.248***
(0.038) (0.036)
const 18.216*** 18.450***
(1.019) (0.727)
N 310 310
Table 5: Random effects regression of response times in the first 16 periods of the
Risk, Ambiguity and Unawareness treatments.
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5.3 Patterns in Average Behavior
We finally analyze the patterns in average behavior across treatments. We construct
the variable absc. For each participant i for periods 1 to 16
absci = javerage choicei   0.5j  2.
absc ranges from 0 to 1. Participants with absc=0 choose the sure outcome and the
lottery an equal number of times. Participants with absc=1 choose only the sure
outcome or only the lottery. Thus, absc shows how often participants switch between
the alternatives.
Figure 6 shows the distributions of absc for the three treatments in periods 1 to 16.
One can see that on average in Unawareness treatment participants tend to switch a
lot between the lottery and sure outcome whereas in the Ambiguity treatment partic-
ipants stick more often to the same alternative.
0
1
2
3
4
0 .5 1 0 .5 1
Risk Ambiguity Unawareness
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 .5 1
Figure 6: Histograms of absc by treatment in periods 1 to 16.
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Figure 7: Histograms of absc by treatment in periods 17 to 32.
Mann Whitney tests show significant difference in the distributions of absc be-
tween Risk and Unawareness (p < 0.041) and between Ambiguity and Unawareness
(p < 0.017) but no significant difference between Risk and Ambiguity (p > 0.542).
This again confirms our hypothesis that choice process in Ambiguity and Risk treat-
ments is different from Unawareness treatment.
The difference between distributions is only observed in the first 16 periods but
not in the periods 17 to 32. All distributions on Figure 7 look the same with the peak
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in the middle and no significance in the Mann-Whitney tests (p > 0.0677, p > 0.1447
and p > 0.6464 respectively). This shows that in periods 17 to 32 participants do react
to the choices in a similar way since they observe full information about the lotteries.
The only difference is a shift in the risk attitudes.
Result 2 1. Participants in Unawareness treatment are less likely to choose the lottery and
display longer response times in the periods immediately following “surprise”.
2. In Unawareness treatment they are less likely to choose the lottery in periods 1
to 16 and react less to the value of the sure outcome compared to either Risk or
Ambiguity treatment which are not significantly different.
3. Response times are overall faster in Unawareness treatment compared to Risk
and Ambiguity treatments. They are faster the higher the value of the sure
outcome in both Risk and Ambiguity treatments, but do not vary with the
value of the sure outcome in the Unawareness treatment.
6 Discussion
In this section we discuss some possible explanations for the lasting effects of past
exposure to Risk, Ambiguity and Unawareness. It seems intuitive that experiencing
more (and unusually high) uncertainty makes people focus more on uncertainty (as
represented by the standard deviation of a lottery) in future decision processes.
In fact several studies in psychology suggest that emotional states influence the per-
ception of risk. For example, it was found that affect (Johnson and Tversky, 1983), fear
(Lerner and Keltner, 2001) and anxiety (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999) make people
more risk averse in the future. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging studies point
at specific regions in the human brain, for example amygdala, that are activated in
these emotional states (see e.g. the meta-study by Phan et al., 2002). We hypothe-
size that experiencing different levels of surprise trigger some of these emotional re-
sponses. Moreover, surprise in the Unawareness treatment seems to be very salient.
Evidence of this is provided in Section 5.
There is also some relation of this work to a literature on behavioural spillovers
(see e.g. Gneezy, Rustichini, and Vostroknutov, 2010; Haruvy and Stahl, 2009; Men-
gel and Sciubba, 2010). These authors show that cognitive skills (such as applying
backward induction or iterated elimination of dominates strategies) can be extrap-
olated across games. It is hard to argue that the spillover effects in our experiment
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have much to do with transfer of cognitive skills or learning. In fact we conducted a
control treatment, where participants only faced the lotteries from periods 17 to 32.
Behaviour in this treatment is not significantly different from behaviour in the risk
treatment.14 There is also no evidence in our study that participants would use dif-
ferent heuristics in periods 17 to 32 across the different treatments. Instead it seems
that their attention is shifted towards giving greater weight to the uncertainty of a
choice option. This supports the view that preferences can be endogenous to the de-
cision situation and can be shaped by previous experiences and/or a process of cul-
tural transmission of norms and ideas. It is also consistent with the “risk-as-feelings”
hypothesis outlined above and supported e.g. by Loewenstein et al. (2001).
14We redid the main regression reported in Table 2 using again Risk treatment as a baseline and
found the following coefficients together with significance levels: dexp 1.117, stdv  0.300, control
 0.200, controlstdv  0.068, const 0.819.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Details of the Design
Table 6 shows the sequence of lotteries and sure outcomes observed by the partici-
pants in periods 17 to 32.
Choice Lottery Sure Outcomes
Cohort
x1 x2 p1 p2 1 2 3 4
17 4 14 0.6 0.4 7.0 7.5 6.0 6.5
18 4 10 0.33 0.67 6.5 7.5 7.0 6.0
19 5 17 0.75 0.25 7.5 6.5 8.0 7.0
20 2 15 0.54 0.46 6.0 7.0 7.5 6.5
21 5 9 0.25 0.75 7.5 8.0 6.5 7.0
22 3 9 0.17 0.83 8.0 7.0 6.5 7.5
23 2 20 0.67 0.33 6.5 7.5 7.0 8.0
24 5 19 0.79 0.21 7.0 6.0 6.5 7.5
25 3 14 0.55 0.45 6.5 8.0 7.5 7.0
26 4 11 0.43 0.57 6.5 7.0 8.0 7.5
27 4 12 0.5 0.5 7.0 6.5 7.5 8.0
28 2 13 0.45 0.55 8.0 6.5 7.0 7.5
29 3 11 0.38 0.62 6.0 7.0 7.5 6.5
30 3 15 0.58 0.42 7.5 6.0 6.5 7.0
31 2 10 0.25 0.75 7.0 7.5 6.0 6.5
32 5 12 0.57 0.43 7.5 6.5 7.0 6.0
Table 6: Choices 17 to 32.
Participants were divided into 4 cohorts. In each choice each cohort faced the
same lottery but different sure outcome. The participants were divided into 4 cohorts
in order to create vmore variability in the data.
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7.2 Definitions of Variables
Variable Definition
per Choice period. Ranges from 1 to 16 for the first 16 periods and 1
to 16 for the last 16 periods (first and last 16 periods are always
analyzed separately)
choice 0/1 variable. Is 1 if the lottery was chosen
resptime Time in seconds it took participant to choose
awar 0/1 variable. Is 1 if the choice is made in the Unawareness treatment
amb 0/1 variable. Is 1 if the choice is made in the Ambiguity treatment
x1, x2 For the last 16 periods: outcomes of the lottery
p1, p2 For the last 16 periods: probabilities of the outcomes of the lottery
sure The sure outcome. For the first 16 periods ranges in [5.4, 8.4], mean
6.9
dexp For the last 16 periods: expected value of the lottery minus sure
outcome = (p1x1 + p2x2)  sure.
Ranges in [ 0.06, 2.04], mean 0.99
stdv For the last 16 periods: square root of the variance of the lottery.
Ranges in [1.73, 8.46], mean 4.54
firstsp 0/1 variable. For periods 1 to 16 in Unawareness treatment: is equal
to 1 in all periods including and after the one in which participant
saw first previously unknown outcome (–1, Twix, or –20)
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7.3 Instructions
7.3.1 Risk Treatment
General Explanations for Participants
You are participating in a choice experiment that is financed by theMarie Curie grant. You
will receive 4 Euro for your participation. You can earn additional money with the decisions
you make. Your earnings may also depend on random events. The exact way your earnings
are calculated is explained in this document and during the experiment. It is, therefore, very
important that you carefully read the following explanations. At the end of the experiment
you will be instantly and confidentially paid in cash all the money you have earned.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate. If you have any questions
please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to answer your questions.
Information on the Exact Procedure of the Experiment
The experiment consists of a main part and a questionnaire. The main part consists of
a sequence of 32 periods. In the questionnaire we will ask you to provide some general in-
formation about yourself. In each period in the main part of the experiment you will have a
chance to earn money. At the end of the experiment you will be paid for one period only that
will be determined randomly.
Instructions for the Main Part of the Experiment
Typical Choice
The main part of the experiment consists of 32 different periods. In each period you can
choose between a lottery and a sure outcome. Here is an example of one period:
Outcomes (Euro)
2 5 7 Sure Outcome (Euro)
0.2 0.5 0.3 4.5
Probabilities
In this example, if you choose sure outcome then in case this period is selected for your
payment you will receive 4.5 Euro in addition to the 4 Euro you receive for your participation.
If you choose the lottery then you might receive 2 Euro, 5 Euro, or 7 Euro (also in addition
to the 4 Euro you receive for your participation). Each of these three possible outcomes can
happen with the probabilities described below each number. For example here there is a 20%
chance that you receive 2 Euro; a 50% chance that you receive 5 Euro; and a 30% chance that
you receive 7 Euro. In case you choose the lottery you will be informed after your choice
about which outcome of the lottery has occurred.
Also keep in mind that irrespective of whether you choose the sure outcome or the lottery
you receive this amount of money only if this period is selected for your payment.
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Non-Monetary Outcomes
The outcomes of the lottery might also be represented by the objects other than monetary
outcomes. For example, you might have a Twix candy as one of the outcomes of the lottery.
If this is the case, instead of the monetary amount you will see a picture like this:
In case you choose a lottery, Twix occurs as the outcome and the period in which you
received Twix is randomly selected for your payment you will receive the candy from the
experimenters in the end of the experiment (plus the show up payment).
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7.3.2 Ambiguity Treatment
General Explanations for Participants
You are participating in a choice experiment that is financed by theMarie Curie grant. You
will receive 4 Euro for your participation. You can earn additional money with the decisions
you make. Your earnings may also depend on random events. The exact way your earnings
are calculated is explained in this document and during the experiment. It is, therefore, very
important that you carefully read the following explanations. At the end of the experiment
you will be instantly and confidentially paid in cash all the money you have earned.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate. If you have any questions
please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to answer your questions.
Information on the Exact Procedure of the Experiment
The experiment consists of a main part and a questionnaire. The main part consists of
a sequence of 32 periods. In the questionnaire we will ask you to provide some general in-
formation about yourself. In each period in the main part of the experiment you will have a
chance to earn money. At the end of the experiment you will be paid for one period only that
will be determined randomly.
Instructions for the Main Part of the Experiment
Typical Choice
The main part of the experiment consists of 32 different periods. In each period you can
choose between a lottery and a sure outcome. Here is an example of one period:
Outcomes (Euro)
2 5 7 Sure Outcome (Euro)
0.2 0.5 0.3 4.5
Probabilities
In this example, if you choose sure outcome then in case this period is selected for your
payment you will receive 4.5 Euro in addition to the 4 Euro you receive for your participation.
If you choose the lottery then you might receive 2 Euro, 5 Euro, or 7 Euro (also in addition
to the 4 Euro you receive for your participation). Each of these three possible outcomes can
happen with the probabilities described below each number. For example here there is a 20%
chance that you receive 2 Euro; a 50% chance that you receive 5 Euro; and a 30% chance that
you receive 7 Euro. In case you choose the lottery you will be informed after your choice
about which outcome of the lottery has occurred.
Also keep in mind that irrespective of whether you choose the sure outcome or the lottery
you receive this amount of money only if this period is selected for your payment.
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Non-Monetary Outcomes
The outcomes of the lottery might also be represented by the objects other than monetary
outcomes. For example, you might have a Twix candy as one of the outcomes of the lottery.
If this is the case, instead of the monetary amount you will see a picture like this:
In case you choose a lottery, Twix occurs as the outcome and the period in which you
received Twix is randomly selected for your payment you will receive the candy from the
experimenters in the end of the experiment (plus the show up payment).
Hidden Information
It is also possible that you will not observe all the information about the lottery. For
example you might see a choice represented like this:
Outcomes (Euro)
2 5 7 Sure Outcome (Euro)
4.5
Probabilities
Here you are still choosing between a sure outcome and some fixed lottery (for example,
this could be the exact same lottery as in the previous example above). The only difference is
that you do not know the probabilities with which the outcomes of the lottery occur. In case
you choose the lottery you will observe the realized outcome immediately.
IMPORTANT NOTE: in ALL periods in which you do not observe the probabilities
of the lottery outcomes, the actual lottery is EXACTLY THE SAME, both in terms of the
outcomes and the unobserved probabilities.
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7.3.3 Unawareness Treatment
General Explanations for Participants
You are participating in a choice experiment that is financed by theMarie Curie grant. You
will receive 4 Euro for your participation. You can earn additional money with the decisions
you make. Your earnings may also depend on random events. The exact way your earnings
are calculated is explained in this document and during the experiment. It is, therefore, very
important that you carefully read the following explanations. At the end of the experiment
you will be instantly and confidentially paid in cash all the money you have earned.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate. If you have any questions
please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to answer your questions.
Information on the Exact Procedure of the Experiment
The experiment consists of a main part and a questionnaire. The main part consists of
a sequence of 32 periods. In the questionnaire we will ask you to provide some general in-
formation about yourself. In each period in the main part of the experiment you will have a
chance to earn money. At the end of the experiment you will be paid for one period only that
will be determined randomly.
Instructions for the Main Part of the Experiment
Typical Choice
The main part of the experiment consists of 32 different periods. In each period you can
choose between a lottery and a sure outcome. Here is an example of one period:
Outcomes (Euro)
2 5 7 Sure Outcome (Euro)
0.2 0.5 0.3 4.5
Probabilities
In this example, if you choose sure outcome then in case this period is selected for your
payment you will receive 4.5 Euro in addition to the 4 Euro you receive for your participation.
If you choose the lottery then you might receive 2 Euro, 5 Euro, or 7 Euro (also in addition
to the 4 Euro you receive for your participation). Each of these three possible outcomes can
happen with the probabilities described below each number. For example here there is a 20%
chance that you receive 2 Euro; a 50% chance that you receive 5 Euro; and a 30% chance that
you receive 7 Euro. In case you choose the lottery you will be informed after your choice
about which outcome of the lottery has occurred.
Also keep in mind that irrespective of whether you choose the sure outcome or the lottery
you receive this amount of money only if this period is selected for your payment.
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Hidden Information
It is also possible that you will not observe all the information about the lottery. For
example you might see a choice represented like this:
Outcomes (Euro)
2 5 Sure Outcome (Euro)
4.5
Probabilities
Here you are still choosing between a sure outcome and some fixed lottery (for example,
this could be the exact same lottery as in the previous example above). The only difference is
that you do not know the probabilities with which the outcomes of the lottery occur. It may
also be the case that you do not know some of the outcomes. For example, if the lottery here
is the same as in the example on the previous page, you do not know that the outcome 7 Euro
can occur. Note that outcomes can occur also if you don’t observe them. If you choose the
lottery and the previously unobserved outcome 7 Euro occurs, then you will observe it as a
possibility afterwards:
Outcomes (Euro)
2 5 7 Sure Outcome (Euro)
6.5
Probabilities
Not all the lotteries you are about to see will have hidden information. For some lotteries
youwill observe the probabilities of the outcomes. To check that there are no hidden outcomes
you may sum up the probabilities and verify that they add up to 1.
IMPORTANT NOTE: in ALL periods in which you do NOT observe the probabilities
and/or the outcomes, the actual lottery is EXACTLY THE SAME, both in terms of the out-
comes and the unobserved probabilities. In addition, some unobserved outcomes will be
revealed to you over time. When this happens you will observe them on your screen.
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